

CONSIDERATIONS ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE WARSAW TREATY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE INDUSTRY

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Abstract: *The historical moments of the end of the Second World War have generated a very complex European security environment on the international geopolitical scene. The Cold War had begun, the Iron Curtain Restrictions System had been established, and in 1949 the Washington Treaty was signed, forming the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO), a military system with the mission of ensuring security on the European continent. In 1955, at the initiative of the USSR, the European communist states concluded the Warsaw Pact, officially called the Warsaw Pact or the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. It was, in fact, also a military alliance formed in response to the North Atlantic Alliance, out of a desire to defend against possible threats or attacks from the NATO system. This article is a study of this period, in which we will give an important place to the analysis of the implications of the Warsaw Pact in the development of the national economic environment, especially of the national defense industry. Despite the unprecedented achievements in the production and export of weapons and ammunition systems, the stability of the Eastern European security environment has been severely affected by the pursuit of undemocratic strategies by Russian state actors, expressed through threats and actions of energy blackmail, intensification of cross-border tensions, attempts to strain relations between states, maintain border conflicts (even between treaty states), as well as annexation of territories using armed force and the strategy of persistent conflict. Such aspects have intensified after the events of the early 1990s, following the abolition of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of the Soviet Empire.*

Keywords: communist states, military treaty, conflict, economic environment, defense industry.

1. INTRODUCTION

Following the official end of the Second World War, the Western European states, which were the great capital of the Western world, pursued a consistent policy of protecting their economic system, especially the economic and military interests of German troops, concentrated in the area of West Germany, which, as "losers", were rearmed to form the basis of the future Bundeswehr, the regular army of the FRG. Moreover, the concern of Western European states was growing exponentially due to the USSR's desire to expand, which was intended to keep its military forces at full capacity and to impose forms of government on European states, especially those in the East, undemocratic. In fact, W. Churchill, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, warned of the USSR's intentions in a speech at the Westminster College in Fulton (March 5, 1946) in the United States. The appearance of the Iron Curtain, dangers that imposed an Anglo-American alliance, as a factor of the balance of power in the area.

In 1947, a treaty of mutual support, collective defense and mutual assistance was concluded in Dunkirk, between Great Britain and France, for the situation in which Germany, once again becoming a European military power, would attack the territory of one of them. Later, between 1947 and 1949, due to the Soviet-led operation to blockade Berlin, some Western European states considered themselves threatened and found it increasingly difficult to bear the Russian presence in Central Europe. Thus, following this operation (1949) we witness the division of the German state into West Germany (FRG) and East Germany (GDR), as well as the later division (in 1961) of the city by the construction by the GDR of the Wall. Berlin ("The Wall of Shame"), symbol of the division of Europe [1]. The wall was designed as a military target, with projectors, observation points, and barbed wire, embodying the inability of the Soviets and Westerners to cut through Berlin and conclude a peace treaty at the end of World War II.

The Treaty of Brussels was concluded in 1948 between the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands [2], in order to intensify economic, cultural and social cooperation between them, to ensure security guarantees in their area of responsibility (cf. art. 4) and, most importantly, to warn the United States that, following the war just ended, in accordance with art. 51 of the UN Charter, measures are needed to intensify the defense against the hostile attitude of the Soviet Union. The treaty was ratified by all participating states, the accession of other states was done by invitation, and the exit from the treaty could be done after at least 50 years. Subsequently, following negotiations between the USA and Canada, the coordinates of the formation of a North Atlantic Alliance consisting of the armies of some democratic states from the continents of North America and Europe are established. At the same time, the great initiating powers invited Denmark, Norway, Iceland and Portugal to participate in the Brussels Military Treaty.

Also in 1948, in Czechoslovakia, amid events of economic reconstruction, the intensification of the operation to expel ethnic Germans, the organization of democratic elections and the infiltration of special services agents from Great Britain and the USA (acting as "agitators") [3], the desire of European states to stop the stationing of Soviet troops on their territory increased after the end of the Great War. These conditions, as well as the USSR's refusal to withdraw its forces on its national territory, in 1949, 12 founding countries (France, Great Britain, USA, Canada, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Italy and Portugal) signed in Washington a treaty laying the foundations of NATO. This treaty guarantees principles such as: individual freedom; democracy; the rule of law; resolving conflicts peacefully; security guarantees; economic collaboration; defensive solidarity with NATO states under attack from outside the alliance; territorial defense of North America and Europe north of the Tropic of Cancer; avoiding contradiction with other treaties; supremacy of the UN Charter; non-modification of the provisions of the treaty for 10 years; meeting of the NATO Council when necessary; NATO membership of other states is by invitation, with documents being filed in Washington; the treaty can be denounced after 20 years with US notification, etc. [4].

2. THE WARSAW PACT, MILITARY TREATY OF THE COMMUNIST STATES, CONCLUDED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE START OF THE COLD WAR AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE IRON CURTAIN

The integration of the FRG into NATO and the ratification by some Western countries of the measures established by the Paris and London Accords accelerated the creation of the Warsaw Pact of the Communist States, under the command of the USSR.

The politico-military initiative belonged to Nikita Khrushchev since the beginning of 1955 and was signed by the partner communist states in Warsaw on May 14, 1955, amid tense events caused by the outbreak of the "Cold War" and the establishment of "Cold War". The Iron Curtain. The motivation of this treaty was in the mirror of that of the Washington Treaty, that is, it would "defend" the communist system from any attempt by the capitalist system to transform Eastern European states into capitalist states.

In essence, the Warsaw Pact (1955-1991), officially called the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, was a politico-military alliance of communist countries in Europe led by the USSR, in response to the threat posed by NATO, for defending against a threat from Western states. Thus, on May 14, 1955, in the capital of Poland, on the occasion of the "Conference of European States for Peace and Security in Europe". all the communist states in Eastern Europe (Soviet Union, Albania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, German DR and Hungary) signed this pact, with the exception of Yugoslavia, the members of the pact agreeing to respect the principle of sovereignty and independence of each partner state and defend each other if they were attacked. It later turned out that this treaty was not a counterweight to the NATO system, in many cases being used by the Soviets to stifle attempts by some Eastern European states to sever ties with the communist system (the case of Hungary, 1956 and Czechoslovakia, 1968).

The Hungarian Revolution of 1956. The death of Stalin (1953) created in Eastern Europe (especially in Poland and Hungary) some hope of a possible change. Thus, a group of young Hungarian students in Budapest, in solidarity with the Polish movement and their national leader, Gomulka, organized a rally of sympathy on October 23, 1956, thus laying the foundations of the Hungarian Revolutionary Movement [5]. The soviet troops violated the provisions of the military treaty and intervened armed in the Hungarian capital, suppressing, in two weeks, the revolutionary movement of young Hungarians. As a result, Nagy Imre's attempt to remove Hungary from the USSR-led communist alliance and install a milder communist system failed on November 4, 1956, marking a difficult time in both Hungarian and European history.

The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 it was a Russian initiative that could have generated a nuclear catastrophe, or an international crisis that could have ended with a nuclear confrontation between the US and the USSR, with the theme of deploying Soviet projectiles with nuclear charges in Cuba. This crisis lasted 38 days (October 14 - November 20) and remained in the history of military art as the time when the "Cold War" could become a nuclear war [6].

The Czech revolutionary movement of 1968 was another example of activating the Warsaw Pact. Alexander Dubcek, chairman of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, led the Czech revolutionary movement whose program was to: denounce the Warsaw Pact; the implementation of a democratic reform program capable of bringing prosperity and freedom to the people; the preparation of the national army to defend, by fighting, if necessary, the sovereignty of the country, etc. In response to the program of the revolutionary movement, on the night of August 20-21, 1968, Soviet soldiers (23 divisions), along with troops from other Warsaw Pact countries (Hungarians, East Germans, Bulgarians, and Poles) invaded Czechoslovakia [7]. Only Albania and Romania refused to participate in the intervention. This fact brought Nicolae Ceausescu a change of attitude to the Western world, which considered him a hero for daring to oppose the Soviets. He denounced the invasion both as a violation of international law and as a violation of the principles of mutual non-interference in internal affairs, saying that collective self-defense against external aggression was the only authorized mission of the Warsaw Pact.

Later, history took revenge on Alexander Dubcek because in 1989, after the Velvet Revolution, Vaclav Havel was elected President of the country, and Alexander Dubcek was President of the Czechoslovak Parliament.

Warsaw Pact and NATO forces have never clashed, but for 35 years they have been active parties in the Cold War. In the late 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev, the then leader of the USSR, proposed replacing the Brezhnev Doctrine with the Sinatra Doctrine, which officially gave Eastern European countries the right to do what they wanted. As a result, it was clear that the Soviet Union was abandoning its strategy of force to control the Warsaw Pact countries, and as a result, immediately after 1989, a number of major changes took place among Eastern European countries: the new governments no longer they were interested in maintaining the Warsaw Pact; in January 1991 Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland announced that they would withdraw from this military organization by 1 July 1991; Bulgaria took the same decision in February 1991; on 3 March 1991, at the Prague meeting, the pact ceased to exist and was officially dissolved on 1 July 1991; on 12 March 1999, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic (former members of the Warsaw Pact) joined NATO; In March 2004, Estonia, Bulgaria, Latvia, Romania, Lithuania, Slovenia and Slovakia also joined the NATO military system.

In conclusion, on the European continent, the collapse of the communist system led to the official dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and it's going down in history, with the signing of official documents in Moscow on July 1st, 1991.

3. IMPLICATIONS OF THE WARSAW TREATY ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE INDUSTRY

During the 1950s, a careful analysis of the situation of the Romanian state army, carried out at the level of the country's leadership and of the heads of the categories of forces, on the subject of its endowment and the development of the defense industry, found that this field needs important investments. As a result, its development and refurbishment have begun. At the level of the treaty, the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, as recognized economic forces in the Eastern European economic environment, contributed decisively to the start of military production processes, offering Romania manufacturing licenses, machines and tools necessary for the production of individual weapons, combat equipment, military equipment and weapon systems, as well as ammunition of all kinds. These investments in the Romanian defense industry, in the construction of fortifications on the border with Yugoslavia and in the southern part of the Romanian Black Sea coast, have generated a weakening of our economy and the massive sale of gold from the reserve of the State Bank of Romania. Romanian state a budget effort equivalent to "the equivalent of about 90 tons of gold" [8].

All imports of military equipment contracted with the Soviet side were included in the endowment of the Romanian army in addition to the combat equipment manufactured by the national defense industry. Thus, after 1951, the Romanian state acquired important quantities of means of combat for our air forces (62 IAK-23 airplanes, one IAK-17 school airplane [9] and multiple MiG 15 airplanes). Subsequently, in compliance with the agreements with the Russian state, Romania continued the process of streamlining the defense industry, mass armament and equipping its forces with weapons, weapons systems and ammunition, concluding agreements with Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary.

From Poland 7.62mm SKS rifles were purchased, STAR type trucks and artillery ammunition for 122mm cannons. Anti-aircraft model 57mm SZ-60 guns were purchased from Hungary, together with infantry and ammunition, SKS rifles, 85 pcs. T34 tanks, 85mm artillery ammunition and radio stations. Other 85 pcs. T34 tanks, S-102 airplanes and 7.62mm SG-43 machine guns, were purchased from Czechoslovakia [10]. The payment for these products was made, in part, with goods of interest to the producing countries, and the rest in gold and currency.

During the years 1952-1954, the investments of the Romanian state, made in the national defense industry, were not at the desired level, fact for which, the implementation of Joseph Stalin's strategy of mass arming of the states from the Soviet bloc was difficult to bear for the Bucharest regime. In this situation, Gheorghe Ghiorghiu-Dej, in order to bear the wave of expenses related to the import of weapons and military equipment, decided to sell a significant part of the gold reserve (from 209.4 tons to 49.7 tons) [11]. In addition, cereals (2 million tons) and meat or meat products were exported to cover these debts.

After the events in Czechoslovakia (1968), the development of the Romanian state led to the improvement of the situation of the national defense industry and the improvement of the military system. This aspect was confirmed in 1970 by Nicolae Ceaușescu, who mentioned: *"Strengthening the country's defense capacity is a vital necessity for the construction of socialism and communism in Romania, and therefore, our party will pay full attention in the future to equip the army with modern means, good military and political training of soldiers"* [12], performance achieved through the more efficient exploitation of internal resources (human, political, military, scientific, economic, financial, demographic, etc.), at the disposal of the development of the national defense system.

The need of strengthening the Romanian state and its defense capabilities is justified by the frequent threats exerted by the great military powers on states rich in economic resources, and their attempt to use armed force to expand their spheres of influence over areas rich in energy resources, such as and to suppress the tendencies of sovereignty and independence of less militarily endowed states. Thus, we can say that since the political decision-maker will prioritize the defense sector and intend to develop it, the country's economy must support it as an important vector of achieving this goal. Moreover, the creation and modernization of production capabilities for military equipment and their sizing were planned according to the structure, size and objectives of the military force, its organization, doctrine, strategy and tactics of its use in operation and combat. These issues were already dictated by the USSR at the Moscow Conference (January 1951), through which Romania had to adopt an expensive, difficult-to-maintain military structure [13].

The Bucharest regime was aware of the efforts of the Romanian state, but *"Taking care of economic development, strengthening Romania's economic strength, we will implicitly strengthen the country's defense capacity"* [14]. The president also declared that *"Life proves that no matter how strong you are economically, you still need some weapons that you know how to handle if necessary."* [15]. Therefore, ensuring a strong defense capability will depend directly on the capability of the defense industry and the degree of support from the other branches (machine building industry, energy, steel, chemical, electronics, etc.). More, *"A war of defense can only be a people's war, and victory will be achieved not only on the battlefield, but through the general struggle of the whole people."* [16].

In other words, solving the problem of equipping the armed forces with the necessary combat equipment will implicitly require the consideration of other state institutions, including the forces of the Patriotic Guards, whose structures had to be properly equipped and specific to each.

The attitude taken by the Romanian state towards the events in Czechoslovakia (1968) strained Romania's relationship with the USSR, thus affecting the possibility of our defense industry to produce licensed military equipment. In addition, the USSR postponed the supply of 50 MiG-21 fighter jets to the Romanian army, 9 MiG-21 school fighter jets, 66 BTR-60 armored car carriers and 41 GRAD rocket launcher systems [17], motivating the inability to honor these contracts due to priorities to other states. Two years later (1970), following a visit to Moscow, Ion Gheorghe Maurer (then prime minister) returns with a new request that included several landmarks, as follows: BTR-60 PB armored car carriers, 14,5mm Anti-aircraft KPVT machineguns, 7,62mm PKS and PKT machineguns, Maliutka antitank rockets, spare parts and subassemblies for MiG-21 PFM, MiG-21 U and MiG-21 PF fighter jets, SPG-9 rocket launchers, etc. [17]. With the only exception of the MiG-21 spare parts, all other parts were accepted to be produced under license by the Romanian state.

Plans for imports of military equipment, to be carried out between 1976 and 1980, included the purchase of 300 tanks, 50 9K31 Strela 1 launcher systems together with 1,500 missiles, 250 9K32M Strela 2 launcher systems with 3,000 related missiles, 4,000 K13M air-to-air missiles, 4,000 R3R air-to-air missiles and about 1,000 radio systems, including KUB and OSA-AKA close-range anti-aircraft missile systems [17]. During this period, the specialized units trained specialists in anti-aircraft missiles, they were mastered "The main concepts of air aggression and anti-aircraft response as dimensions of the vertical component of modern warfare" [18] and anti-aircraft missile launchers were experienced in the Cape Midia Range and in the ranges provided by the Soviet Union to Warsaw Pact member countries.

CONCLUSIONS

Analyzing the implications of the Warsaw Pact for the development of the national defense industry, we consider that at least the following conclusions are necessary:

- During the communist period, during the functioning of the treaty, Romania made great financial efforts to ensure and strengthen the country's defense capacity, in the face of threats that emerged after the end of the world conflagration, the performance of our defense industry in the ability to supply military equipment, from 45% in the '60s to 75% in the early '70s;

- Although the Cold War is over, the interest of state actors in arming and improving military production capabilities has grown exponentially, hybrid threats have emerged and amplified (economic, psychological, geophysical, ethnic, religious, etc.), and technological gaps. they could no longer be ignored, as they were sources of political, economic and military instability, as evidenced by the conduct of armed conflicts in various parts of the globe;

- The threats and the continued presence of the Russian military force at the border of some Eastern European states should be a warning signal for all states in the area, including Romania, in the sense of understanding that the preparation for the high-intensity technological war requires the revival of industry. defense, a new technology, superior combat capabilities of weapons systems, intelligence and high capabilities, decisive in balancing the balance of power, in common operations.

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